The nature of underreporting terrorism in developing countries is often acknowledged but poorly understood. Focusing on India, we triangulate terrorist attacks captured across three mediabased datasets (GTD, SATP, WITS) against official police records from Andhra Pradesh. Results suggest that media-based datasets capture the geographic prevalence of terrorism yet severely underestimate the frequency of violence, biasing towards lethal bombings. Considerable variation is present for attacks targeting specific classes or types of actors. Similar to other crimes, the results suggest that existing terrorism databases represent a select version of violence in these countries, discounting the prevalence and regularity of non-lethal violent activity.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, one of the most widely-used methods of empirical analysis on insurgency, political violence, and terrorism is the collection and coding of events from openmedia sources. A number of datasets on political violence have become publicly available, allowing researchers to apply statistical methodologies to identify the correlates, causal factors, and consequences of political violence.
For all of the empirical advances in the study of political violence and insurgency, little is known about the potential sources for error in existing media-based datasets. A majority of studies use a single data source of events, which contain potential biases that alter the number, type, and classification of events available for analysis. 1 Some events are viewed as more "newsworthy" and thus are more likely to be reported 2 , including large, significant events 3 with police presence 4 in proximity to a news agency 5 and located in an urban area away from most types of land-based or rural conflicts. 6 Failure to account for these biases can present political violence as primarily lethal attacks in urban areas conducted by major non-state actors. 7 In the few studies where multiple sources are used, they are often integrated with little consideration regarding the type and nature of data collection which produced the original set of events. 8 In these cases, events are not equivalent across samples, but are productions imbued with social and
political considerations about what is and is not an "event."
To address these concerns, we examine how the data collection process can alter or shade the representation of political violence at the local level, and the implications that has for research in this area. This study compares the representative level of a specific type of political violence (terrorist attacks) captured across three media-based datasets against official police records, a source often missing from studies on terrorism and political violence. This is a good case study for how international datasets engage with domestic terrorism. The nature of Naxal insurgency is widespread and longstanding enough to be of serious national concern in India, a democratic country with free and open multi-lingual media. Andhra Pradesh, one of several Indian states that have been grappling with Naxal insurgency, has the most detailed records of 'Naxal related cases' compiled at the state level 9 . Using the Naxalite conflict in Andhra Pradesh as our context, we find that although media-based datasets capture the geographic prevalence of political violence, they tend to severely underestimate the intensity of conflict at the local level and bias the representation by favoring lethal attacks and those involving explosives. In addition, there is considerable variation across datasets regarding specific classes or types of actors targeted by political violence, often influenced by the process in which an attack is sourced, collected and adjudicated.
The paper is structured as follows: The first section discusses the nature of data collection during conflict in both media-based and official datasets. The next two sections describe the research questions, context and background of the Naxal insurgency within Andhra Pradesh. The subsequent two sections focus on the data and methodology adopted, followed by the results and reasons for the variation between media-based datasets and official data sources. The final sections include a discussion of the implications and recommendations for future research using media-based datasets.
NATURE OF DATA COLLECTION ON TERRORISM

Media-Sourced Attack Databases
The past two decades have witnessed a sea change in the global accessibility of news on conflict and violence. Previously the purview of government efforts like the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the diffusion of the Internet now provides constant viewership to conflicts worldwide through news and social media. This availability has enabled the emergence of several international event-level databases which quantify terrorism. Databases such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset on transnational terrorism, the Worldwide Incident Terrorism System (WITS), the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), and others have developed multiple perspectives on terrorism, each with their strengths and weaknesses. Across the empirical study of terrorism, the post-9/11 swell of research has relied primarily on the ITERATE or GTD datasets for their analyses, often used, "without questioning their underlying definitions, coding consistency or contrasts." 10 Key contrasts, such as the differentiation between domestic and transnational terrorism, have shaped research findings in substantive ways 11 , yet little comparative work exists to identify how these multiple views of terrorism relate to each other and to conditions "on the ground."
The challenging nature of collecting event-level data on terrorism has meant that most databases rely on print or electronic media for terrorism reports. While terrorist attacks are more likely to be reported in the media than other types of criminal activity 12 , Schmid 13 identified four problems with most terrorism databases. First, each database suffers from the inherent difficulties involved with working definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts. Wider situational, contextual and political factors determine whether certain acts will be perceived as terrorism or not by various audiences. Where one dataset will include terrorist attacks against military targets
[GTD], others will exclude those as acts of insurgency [ITERATE] . Stringent inclusion criteria can also contribute to the exclusion of unclear attacks, such as those without independent confirmation or with conflicting reports, from the set of attacks.
Second, even if a working definition of terrorism is adopted, it is often inconsistently applied at different points of time for a variety of reasons. Some of these include changing political contexts surrounding specific organizations and their intersection with political violence. 14 18 More importantly, the likelihood of an attack being reported could rely on whether other relevant attacks are reported nearby (which can vary from season to season), editor or reporter bias, and whether the news agency has the necessary resources to cover the attack.
Finally, only a few media-based databases collect data on domestic terrorist attacks, especially in less-developed nations. Media-based databases such as the GTD and WITS include domestic terrorist attacks in developing countries but draw mainly upon electronic and print media reports reported in widely-disseminated national newspapers or international Englishlanguage sources. In many countries, including India, the likelihood of an attack being picked up by the national media would depend upon the location and seriousness of the attack and the interest of the local media in reporting it. 19 Attacks that are reported in smaller, local vernacular press are unlikely to be identified and subsequently included in many international databases.
Despite these problems, many have argued that newspaper sources remain a reasonably complete and continuous source for data collection, assuming that the variance provided by press bias is stable within and across sources. 20 More importantly, to draw inference on the nature of terrorism, users of these databases assume that any missing data on terrorist attacks is randomly distributed and not the product of the data collection process.
Official Data
A second potential source of data on terrorist activity, albeit underutilized, is official data collected by government counterterrorism or law enforcement agencies. Often collected by states with a long history of terrorism (Turkey, Israel, Colombia, and the United States 21 ), these countries have established both systematic and/or ad hoc frameworks for identifying, analyzing, and reporting terrorist-related activity; frameworks with considerable within-and betweencountry variation. These datasets have been used to analyze the spatial distribution of terrorism 22 , build geographic profiles of offenders 23 , and assess the deterrent effect of arresting terrorists 24 . These sources could also provide rich detail on specific plots or attacks drawn from extensive investigations or court records that are never reported by media, providing an alternative perspective of terrorism as mediated through official channels. 25 While useful, three specific limitations of official data stand out. 26 First, definitions of terrorism are often overloaded by emotional and political implications with little agreement between agencies and individuals. 27 Second, the police can often attribute non-violent or other criminal actions arising from non-ideological motives committed by known terrorist organizations as terrorist acts. These types of non-terrorist acts, including extortion and assault, could be used for personal gain and/or to instill fear or terror in a target population, rendering it difficult to distinguish the purely acquisitive or personal crimes from terrorism in some official data collection efforts. It has also been suggested that while police archives are a good alternative to media-based datasets, they also project their own biased view of offender and offense. 28 1991, found that the vast majority of demonstrations were ignored by the media, leaving only the largest ones covered. As a political conflict progresses, the use of violence may become routine, fatiguing the press into covering only the most severe events. 39 The inherently administrative character of the state when policing terrorism provides an alternative source which may capture a broader range of violence than available through open media sources, although the extent to which these two sources differ remains understudied.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Overall, we are interested in examining potential issues of selection bias within three publically-available databases on terrorism: the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS), and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).
Several of these sources have provided the basis for quantitative analyses previously 40 , yet to date there have been no studies comparing the quality of data collection among all three. 41 Some studies which try to improve the quality of data analysis integrate or combine multiple datasets to acquire the broadest account of data on a specific conflict, yet utilize media sources which rely on select information migrating into the public sphere. We compare the three collections of terrorist attacks, as well as a combined version of all three, against a fourth source of event data
(official police records), which the literature suggests may contain more or fewer recorded attacks than media-based data sources. Second, we examine whether this variation is spatially or temporally patterned. Each of these datasets is the result of a collection schema that is carried out over time, and each can have important variation regarding where and how often cases are collected. Third, we are interested in the typological variation among attacks reported across the four sources, and where these facets of terrorism diverge. Are media-based collections more likely to contain certain types of terrorist attacks (bombings, fatal attacks), and do differences in the environmental context of an attack (the distance from the capital, ruggedness, etc.) affect the likelihood of attacks being reported? Even though many studies of conflict employ structural factors (like poverty) as controls 42 , little research as examined whether attacks in these areas are less likely to be reported.
Variation in reporting based on ecological factors surrounding an attack can have substantial impacts on theories of political violence, as it may overestimate the relationship between certain geographic or demographic factors and the prevalence of insurgency.
We address these three questions by examining the recorded prevalence and quality of terrorist attacks within a rural land-based conflict in a developing country: the Maoist insurgency in Andhra Pradesh. 43 We utilize records from 2005 to 2009, a period in which all four datasets maintain coverage of terrorist attacks within the region. Additionally, the period under review is sufficiently past the initiation of the Maoist conflict in Andhra Pradesh, and therefore should maximize the likelihood of coverage by media sources. This is especially true as the nature of the conflict in Andhra Pradesh became more central to the mission of the state government, and the publicity surrounding the counterterrorism efforts in the state drew national attention. 
THE MAOIST CONFLICT IN ANDHRA PRADESH
In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared the Naxal movement, increasingly referred to as left wing extremism (LWE) or Maoism, as the 'single largest internal security threat' that India has faced. 45 The Maoist movement has a long history in Andhra Pradesh, fueled by a number of grievances against the state, including: lack of land reforms, labor exploitation, lack of governance, lack of development and employment opportunities, statesponsored exploitation of natural resources at the expense of tribal populations, deepening caste and economic inequalities, and lack of access to justice. 46 Initially starting as a Communist struggle against feudal rule in the 1940s, the movement morphed into an agrarian uprising over land reforms in the 1960s. While tempered during the 1970s, the Communist movement began to regain strength in the early 1980s, spawning several splinter groups, including the People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar. 47 The PWG was committed to armed struggle against the state, including kidnapping, extortions, and the killing of civilians and political leaders. 48 The late 1980s saw a dramatic escalation of conflict after the PWG decided to target the state directly through attacks on the police, inaugurating a campaign of violence which still continues currently. 49 This cyclical upsurge of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence led to substantial casualties for security forces, who have responded with severe state repression, brutal search and cordon operations, torture, beatings and displacement of populations. 50 Eventually, the government adopted a developmentfocused approach to erode popular support for the Naxals as well. 51 The 2004 merger of the PWG and the MCC to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist) ushered in a new phase in the Naxalite Movement, which assumed a pan-India form with a centralized leadership under unified command and control. At the time, the Andhra Pradesh government called for a six-month hiatus in the conflict to conduct peace talks.
However, since peace talks broke down in early 2005, the state has been uncompromising in its opposition of the Maoists. Using a number of the strategies previously mentioned, the government of Andhra Pradesh has been mostly successful in reducing the frequency of Naxalite violence within the state, evidenced by declining fatalities of security forces as well as civilians.
Andhra Pradesh police have been actively involved in a rising number of arrests and surrenders of Naxals, including prominent leaders, which have weakened the movement considerably.
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Towards the end of 2009 the state witnessed a surge of Naxal activities in the districts of the Telangana region in a bid to regain their stronghold in these areas, but with limited success. 53 As of 2014, active Naxal presence is largely confined to two districts -a sea change from the situation in 2005 when nearly all of the 28 districts in Andhra Pradesh were considered to be highly or moderately affected. 54 While the situation continues to cause grave concern, the total number of casualties (civilians and security forces) associated with the movement has been declining nationally from 1005 in 2010 to 415 in 2012; and in Andhra Pradesh from 24 in 2010 to 13 in 2012. 55 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Given the strengths and weaknesses of terrorism data discussed above, researchers have long recognized the need for using multiple data sources to triangulate the phenomena under study. 56 To examine the salience of data collection procedures on the identification of political violence in India, we chose four event-level datasets that capture this information relevant to the Times, and the Wall Street Journal). It defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." 59 The GTD has utilized a similar basic coding scheme during the entire 41 years of data collection. Compared to other media-based databases, from its inception GTD has tracked the kind of domestic terrorist attacks that have characterized localized conflicts like the Maoists in India. Yet a comparison against other sources of terrorist activity remains lacking. Relevant to this discussion, the GTD also includes attacks against the military and police, actions that are sometimes classified in other media-based databases as insurgent actions and distinct from terrorist attacks. One limitation of both the GTD and WITS is the requirement of intentionality as a criterion for inclusion in the database. Specifically, there has to be no evidence in the attack that the attack was started by someone other than the group committing the attack. "Clashes"
Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS)
between security forces and terrorist organizations, common in a number of insurgent environments, do not satisfy this requirement, as it would be difficult to distinguish who initiated the attack. While some of these "clashes" may actually have been extrajudicial killings initiated by the security forces, otherwise known as "police encounters" within India 62 , the limited information on attacks contained within many media-based sources in these areas restricts the ability of the researcher to succinctly identify these cases. What is presented provides at best a conservative estimate of the actual group-initiated violence in these areas.
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)
A third set of data relevant to the Maoist conflict in India comes from the South Asia Terrorism Portal. A product of the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) in New Delhi, the SATP reviews a large number of national and local newspapers, government and nongovernment publications, and other web-based media sources for reports on violence, insurgency, and terrorism across a number of violent conflicts in India and other South Asian countries. 63 It is a source of information for a variety of data collection efforts which use it as either a primary source of data collection 64 or as a secondary "seed" source to provide preliminary information on attacks that can be corroborated with additional primary source media. 65 Event-level information within SATP is reported in a semi-unstructured list which describes the action conducted, geographic information on where the event occurred, and the date of those actions. Data on these events do not reside in a structured format for analysis.
Researchers interested in using this information must recode the data manually. 
Andhra Pradesh Police
To complement the three media-based data collections, and to provide a more detailed set of Naxal terrorist events in Andhra Pradesh, the fourth dataset examined was received from the Andhra Pradesh Police. This database includes every reported event of Naxal related-violence or threat recorded in individual police stations across the state. The State Intelligence Bureau has access to all recorded crimes at the state level and compiles a state-wide database of Naxal-related events as they are recorded. It does not distinguish between ideological and nonideological events, but includes all events where the alleged perpetrators are known or suspected of being Naxalites. As mentioned above, these might include crimes committed by alleged Naxalites for personal causes, and this more expanded inclusion criterion implies that more, rather than fewer, events are captured by this data set compared to other sources. Brief facts of the case in the original data were coded to construct categories similar to the above datasets. It includes events that would not ordinarily qualify as a terrorist attack under the criteria set by GTD or WITS. However, it is extremely instructive in illustrating the types of events considered to be related to Naxal insurgency by the local law enforcement agency.
As police-recorded data, these data suffer from all the traditionally accepted deficiencies that official police data suffers from as discussed above. The original Andhra Pradesh police data demonstrates changing modes in recording practices which could skew inferences about trends and patterns. 66 Although official data provided by the Andhra Pradesh police may contain some variations in the coding strategy across time, the systematic and comprehensive efforts they undertook to collate this data at the state level provides a unique opportunity to utilize official, event-level data collected during an insurgency.
Methodology
To examine the potential sources of selection bias and case reporting variation among these four sources, we employed a four-phase process. First, we conducted a case-by-case definitional alignment between each of the data collections. To maintain uniformity of definition between datasets, and to focus on terrorist attacks by Naxalites, we applied the GTD criteria to all four datasets and removed any events which were neither terrorist in definition nor leftist in ideological motivation (see Table 1 ). Across all four sources, only those cases which identified Naxal actors proactively committing a violent attack to further a political, social, or economic goal were included, with differences noted in the analysis. Project coders were trained by two of the authors who have multi-year experience coding GTD data, and each attack was coded according to the established criteria and subsequently reviewed by one of the authors to ensure consistency in coding.
Second, using a combination of descriptions and case attributes, we were able to triangulate cases among the various sources. This allows us to identify those cases which overlapped across all four sources, as well as those attacks which were unique to each data collection. Each comparison was initially conducted by a project coder and then reviewed by one of the authors to ensure accuracy in the case matching process. Search windows 14 days before and after a particular attack were used, as dates for specific attacks can vary considerably when comparing media and police sources. In addition, coders erred on the side of inclusion when key details (such as target or number killed, for example) were vague in one of the two matched attacks, providing a conservative estimate of the number of attacks excluded from media-based datasets. Contrasting details between two nearly similar attacks, such as distinctly different targets or attack types, did not meet the threshold for matching and were not linked within the collection effort. For example, considering two attacks in the same district on the same day, if both had the same target type but one reported a death and another didn't, then ceterus paribus, they were matched. If these two attacks were reported as one targeting physical infrastructure and one targeting civilians in a marketplace, then the contrasting details would render them unmatched.
Third, we employed descriptive analysis to identify potential variations in case reporting across the sources. Both spatial and temporal aspects of variation in case reporting are considered, as well as differentiation across various attack characteristics (fatal attacks, bombings, etc.). Finally, to examine whether environmental or structural factors influence the likelihood that an attack would be found within the media-based collections, we test a number of hypothesis in predicting the likelihood using logit models to compare cases from WITS, SATP, GTD, and an integrated dataset containing all unique cases from the media-based databases against cases from the police. Applying the definition alignment mentioned previously, Table 2 presents our final count of terrorist attacks for the four datasets, which netted a total of 806 attacks in the police data, followed by WITS with 296 attacks, SATP with 197 attacks, and GTD with 24 attacks.
Table 2 about here
Once a common definition of left-wing terrorism was applied at the event-level across all four datasets, we conducted a case-by-case comparison to triangulate overlapping attacks between the collections. Using the police data as a starting point and using descriptions and case attributes to triangulate, between 85 and 90 percent of cases across the datasets were matched to cases in the police data 68 . Across those cases in the media-based datasets that were not found in the police data, several key patterns emerge. First, the lethality of an attack had little consistent influence on its omission from the police data. In some cases (SATP), the majority of missing attacks were fatal (10 of 17 attacks), while in other cases (WITS and GTD), the proportion that In the process of triangulation, however, new information was introduced on a number of cases; information which would change whether the case met the criteria for terrorism mentioned previously. For example, an attack on July 10 th , 2005 in SATP mentioned that CPI (M) Janshakti cadres abducted two employees of a transport company in the district of Khammam. However when we compared that attack to police data, we found that those abductions were solely for ransom, which does not meet the criteria of terrorism applied in this study, and the attack was subsequently dropped from the comparison. To provide a conservative estimate of the number of terrorist attacks which match across the datasets, we removed those cases from the overall analysis which were no longer classified as terrorist attacks based on the new information. This removed another two attacks from GTD, six attacks from SATP, and 12 attacks from WITS.
Temporal Variation
To examine temporal variation in matching between the three media-based datasets and the police data, Table 3 represented only a share of the total attacks reported within the police data, the temporal trends of the three datasets were roughly similar across the periods, suggesting that differences may be one of magnitude rather than type of attack (see Figure 1) . 
Spatial Variation
Finally, we consider whether variation exists in the geographic distribution of reported attacks. Comparing total, fatal, and bombing attacks across administrative districts 71 in Figure 2 , we see that terrorist attacks reported by the police are distributed throughout the majority of Andhra Pradesh, representing the broad nature of terrorist activity among the Maoists during this period. Fatal attacks were concentrated in a smaller number of districts, while bombings occurred most often in Vishakapatnum, Khamam, and Warangal districts in the center and east of the state. Comparing across datasets, we find that WITS, SATP, and the police data all report a number of the same districts as top location for terrorist activity. For example, two of the top three districts in each dataset were Khammam and Vishakapatnum, consistent with the conflict over land rights in forested areas central to the ideology of the Maoists in these two districts. 72 In contrast, both WITS and SATP underrepresent terrorist attacks in several other districts, including Karimnagar (3 percent of WITS and 4 percent of SATP cases, respectively) compared to attacks reported by the police (9 percent). This district in particular served as the site of an important strategic development in the counterterrorism efforts against the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh 73 , and underrepresenting the level of terrorist violence in the district would hinder efforts to identify successful outcomes of experimental policies like the one implemented.
Nevertheless, while there were geographic variations in the proportion of terrorist attacks in one district compared to another, with noted exceptions the differences across datasets geographically were one of magnitude within-district rather than variation between districts. 74 
Figure 2 about here
Predicting the Likelihood of Reporting
We find a moderate yet substantive level of variation in reporting terrorist attacks across the media-based datasets when compared to official records maintained by the State Police. To parse the specific leverage that these variations simultaneously exert, we employ logistic regression models to examine the odds that different types of variation would have on the likelihood of matched attacks being reported in each of the datasets. Beyond the types of variation listed above, we included a number of predictors which may influence the nature of newspaper coverage or readership in each district where an attack occurred. These factors include the district-level percent of population 1) in scheduled castes or tribes; 2) living below the poverty line; and 3) with at least a middle school education. We also include a number of environmental factors at the district-level traditionally associated with the occurrence of insurgency or conflict, including 4) the percent of the land area with greater than 6 percent slope (ruggedness); 5) the percent of land area covered with forests (forest area); and 6) the logged distance between the center of the district and the state capital of Hyderabad. Finally, we examine whether previous attacks in a district draw media attention to that location, which may increase the likelihood of a subsequent attack being captured by a media-based dataset, by including a measure of 7) whether there was an attack in the same district within 30 days prior to the attack under study (previous attack).
Additionally, there have been several recent efforts to merge data from SATP and GTD or WITS together into an integrated dataset for hypothesis testing. 75 The hope has been to create a comprehensive dataset which captures more of the variation in violence at the attack level, with multiple independent sources contributing cases which are not captured in the other databases.
Merging data drawn from different sources and through different collection protocols could also amplify potential sources of bias rather than address them. To evaluate the veracity of this claim, we combined unique attacks drawn from SATP, GTD or WITS into a single dataset, and examined whether the factors above influenced variations in this dataset compared to police records.
Table 4 about here
The results confirm that compared to police data, several of the descriptive patterns of variation among the datasets also increase the odds of reporting in a media-based dataset considerably. Table 4 includes odds ratios from logistic regression models 76 with year dummies at the dataset level in which a binary variable for reporting in a dataset (0 = non-reported, 1 = reported) is regressed against specific types of attacks, as well as environmental and geographic factors. Compared to other types of attacks in the police data, fatal attacks were more than six times as likely to be reported in a media-based dataset as non-fatal attacks, strongly suggesting their over-representation in these collections. Additionally, bombings were nearly three times as likely to be reported in a media-based dataset as other types of attacks for all but the GTD.
Considering environmental variation in attack reporting, we find that as the percentage of ruggedness in a district increases in Andhra Pradesh, there is a greater likelihood that the attack will end up in WITS or SATP. Contrasted to the level of ruggedness within a district, we find that attacks in heavily forested areas have a lower likelihood of being captured in at least one of the databases (WITS). Particularly for the WITS dataset, as attacks occur in a specific district, they also increase the odds that subsequent attacks within 30 days will be recorded within the data.
In addition, several predictors influenced the likelihood of reporting for one dataset but not the other, highlighting the role that production strategies within each of the datasets can influence inclusion. Attacks which targeted local officials (including village leaders), attacks against political party activists, and attacks which targeted police or security forces were more likely to be reported in SATP than other types of attacks. The primary governmental representatives targeted by the Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh during the study period were the police, with over 130 attacks across the five years. Given the use of local media outlets and newsletters by staff at SATP, it is reasonable to assume that these types of sources would favor reporting on attacks against local officials or party members since these types of attacks will be of more interest to local readers who favor local newspapers and newsletters. In contrast, attacks against state officials and leaders were more likely to be recorded within both WITS and GTD, as these types of attacks tend to draw regional and even national coverage in sources used by these data collection efforts.
Finally, testing a strategy of data integration of all the unique cases within the three datasets we find that bombings, fatal attacks, those where the proportion of scheduled populations is high, and those which occur in rugged areas would be more likely to be reported in an integrated media-based dataset than other types of attacks. By complimenting the data collection strengths of each of the underlying datasets, the results suggest that integrated approaches obscure the over-representation of several specific types of attacks relevant to local conflict dynamics, including attacks against local officials, police/security forces, and political party activists. Overall, results from the integrated dataset were not qualitatively different than results obtained from either the WITS or the SATP data, except for magnitude. While WITS reported 256 matched attacks, SATP reported 174 attacks, and GTD reported 19 attacks, the integrated dataset contained 293 unique terrorist attacks across the three datasets. This only accounted for roughly 36% of the total reported attacks contained in the police records, and only a 14 percent increase in the number of attacks as compared to WITS.
DISCUSSION
What Remains Missing from Media-Based Datasets on Terrorism
The results above suggest that within the local dynamics of the Naxal insurgency of Andhra Pradesh, media-based datasets of terrorist attacks fail to capture a substantial amount of those attacks. At best, almost two-thirds of terrorist attacks recorded by the police (513 attacks)
were missing from any of the three datasets evaluated here. While many of these attacks were not lethal, they included strategies and tactics similar to terrorist campaigns in Ireland or Spain, including the killing of suspected police informants and the destruction of infrastructure and government property. For example, Naxals in nine separate occasions used explosives or arson to destroy telephone infrastructure within a two-year period, none of which were captured by the media-based datasets. In addition, over 100 attacks involved the violent targeting of business owners selling liquor, election workers manning polls, contractors working construction sites, and civilians violating other Naxal proscriptions, only 18 of which were captured by mediabased datasets. Such attacks resonate with the local populace and law enforcement, and their exclusion means media-based datasets may underestimate the frequency at which violent organizations use terrorism at the local-level to coerce a population and government. Often these attacks are not reported in national or international English media, the primary source for most media-based datasets.
The Broader Context of Terrorism within an Insurgency
Beyond missing terrorist attacks, the results from our comparison highlight additional types of events often excluded from media-based datasets on terrorism. Official data collection efforts regularly contain a broader array of actions than datasets focused on terrorism. Nearly 40 percent of the original Naxal events categorized as aggressive acts by the police in Andhra Pradesh (631 events) fell outside the common definitions of terrorism used in this study, highlighting the wider ecology of aggression in which terrorist attacks can be found. Of these, almost half (297 events) refer to cases of extortion or looting committed by Naxal actors using threat or force to raise funds for their political arm. While these events were excluded from our analysis due to their primary economic motive (akin to common robbery), police interviewed by the second author in 2011 in Andhra Pradesh reported little operational differentiation between these acts and other forms of violent aggression by Naxals. According to them, these crimes do provide a window into how insurgency affects local residents, suggesting that the requirements for political motive embedded within datasets on terrorism may be difficult to determine in the context of violent domestic conflicts.
Alongside purely economic crimes committed by Naxal actors, another fifty percent (321 events) of the excluded events recorded in the police data refer to 'exchanges of fire' between Naxalites and security forces. Difficulties in determining whether the non-state actor intentionally committed and/or planned the attack led to their exclusion from this comparison against media-based terrorist attacks, although the fog of war can often cloud the documentation of 'who shot first' within internal conflicts. Naxalite documents clearly indicate paramilitary and security forces to be legitimate targets in the revolutionary war and specifically mention "wiping out the enemy in vulnerable areas." 77 On the other hand, the police have been known to target Naxals under the pseudonym of these 'exchange of fire' events. 78 In these circumstances, the exclusion of 'exchange of fire' events to fit within conventional definitions of terrorism may mask the broader interchange of violence between the state and violent organizations which are prevalent within insurgencies.
Implications for Future Research on Terrorism
Our results suggest that media-based datasets on terrorism exhibit considerable variation in their coverage of domestic terrorist attacks in developing countries. When compared to official data sources, terrorist attacks within media-based datasets are disproportionately lethal and explosive, underrepresenting a considerable range of violent, politically-motivated activity which meet their criteria for inclusion. These biases in sample selection can have substantive consequences for the internal and external validity of research on terrorism 79 , requiring scholars to rigorously consider these variations in their research design. 80 Our findings indicate that although previous studies have cautioned against the use of official police data in terrorism research because it might be restrictive 81 , using official police data can be rewarding, albeit when used with caution. All data are biased along some dimension, and the presence of attacks within the media-based datasets that were not found within the official data suggests that these biases must also be addressed when using official data. Police data suffer from some of the same reporting limitations in heavily-contested areas which face media sources, and the increasing likelihood of missing cases in later years of data collection suggest that researchers using official data need to consider the role that administrative exhaustion can exert with official data collection efforts. Moreover, the broader array of events captured within official data requires additional scrutiny, depending on the question being answered. One recommendation is that researchers in areas of domestic terrorism could foster mutually beneficial relationships with concerned law enforcement agencies to access official data sources which might not be open access. Further, they can use this data, along with qualitative studies on terrorism, to consider whether and how the larger open source terrorism databases capture or reflect the nature, shape and manifestation of a broader insurgency and its impact on the local populace. These efforts should not proceed without skepticism of inclusion criteria and reporting practices for these official data, as the misuse of official data can bias inference as much as the under-reported open source data.
Our research also indicates that the more rugged the terrain, the more likely it is that the attack will be included in the media-based database. 82 One explanation is that in rugged areas,
given their difficult terrain and lower population density, terrorist attacks are more infrequent and therefore more "newsworthy." This has important implications, since many studies of insurgency find increased levels of conflict in more rugged areas. 83 If these studies use data collected from open media sources, the initial findings from a single conflict here suggest that they are more likely to capture attacks in rugged regions. Thus, the relationship between terrain and conflict intensity may be a product of the data collection strategy rather than an underlying causal factor.
Relevant to the Naxal conflict, our research also revealed that attacks in forested areas are less likely to be included in the media-based databases as compared to less-forested areas. One explanation for this may be "media exhaustion" resulting from the continual and routine occurrence of Naxal conflict in these areas. Grievances resulting from land reform disputes between the Naxals and the Indian government provide the central narrative for which Naxal violence has been committed, and districts which are heavily forested also hold the primary relevance for the Naxal political strategy. We suggest that the 'mundane' nature of terrorism in these regions (threats, beatings, or destruction of government property) leaves fewer and fewer unique cases of terrorism reducing the likelihood of reporting. Other explanations for low reporting include lack of media access to these more remote locations, or the general instability within the district, which may prevent reporters from filing on these attacks or coerce their silence out of fear for reprisals.
Another reason for low reporting is the fact that these forest areas are Maoist strongholds and so it is possible that they might have greater control on media coverage -especially reporting attacks that might reduce their popularity and eventually lead their core supporters to move away. Some accounts suggest that by highlighting the targeting of local infrastructure and individuals, popular support for Naxals in Andhra Pradesh was substantially reduced. 84 Even though the purpose of terrorism is to draw attention to their cause through violence 85 , we suggest that Naxals might prefer to censor media reporting of their activities as part of a broader media management campaign, especially if they involved 'mundane' attacks against civilians. The very fact that the terrorist attacks are plentiful, 'mundane,' and not reported in the media means that the actual extent of 'terror' on the ground is not properly reflected where analysis rely on mediabased datasets alone.
A final implication is that the substantial exclusion of terrorist attacks (and even those that fall on the definitional fringe) limits the ability to examine the true impact of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency efforts at the local level. 86 What appears as a successful counterterrorism effort (by reducing the number of fatal attacks in a given year) may actually hide the subsequent tactical transference by violent organizations towards softer targets which don't attract as much extra-local attention. Failure to capture these less-lethal attacks can provide a false basis for selecting between counterterrorism strategies, ultimately influencing the ability to build an evidence-based framework for counterterrorism.
CONCLUSION
Our research suggests that studies on domestic terrorism which use data drawn from media sources may be biased due to an inconsistency between the occurrence of terrorism and its reporting within media sources. Even when the definition of terrorism is standardized across different datasets which draw from different media sources, the results may represent only a part of the actual universe of terrorist attacks. However, we are not suggesting that government data should be the gold standard by which scholars should evaluate their datasets. Not only do few countries maintain such datasets, but even when they exist, scholars are rarely given access to such information. Moreover in countries like India, the security forces remain under substantial political influences 87 , leaving it entirely possible that terrorism may be over-or undercounted in government records. This might be especially true of the period for which the data were analyzed, as it was a very important phase in the State's effort to curb insurgency in the region and it is possible that this affected how the data were recorded. Where possible, to overcome this limitation multiple sources available to researchers should be used to triangulate results across the various data collections. And sometimes (like in this case) the integrated dataset may still not be fully representative to the kinds of terrorist-related activity on the ground. In those cases, it is advisable for researchers to proceed with caution, especially while making predictions and policy recommendations based on available media-based data.
reported, editorialized and subsequently picked up by media-based datasets. This may be especially true for places where media reporting is either difficult due to contextual factors (like restricted access to conflict areas) or where electronic media presence remains limited. Creating an 'error profile', which Chermak and colleagues find "identifies possible sources within the data collection methodology that may bias the results through non-sampling errors" 88 for each of the media-based datasets would provide a surer footing for future efforts to understand the causes and correlates of terrorism, especially if the collection managers themselves developed these profiles drawn from a nuanced understanding of their specific dataset. For an attack to be included in the GTD all of the following (3) attributes must be present: 1. Attack must be intentional-result of conscious calculation on the part of the perpetrator 2. Attack must entail some level of violence 3. There must be sub-national perpetrators (GTD limits itself to non-state terrorism) In addition, at least 2 of the following criteria must be present before an attack can be included:
4. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion 5. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience ( 
